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Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of the Law
Abe Fortas
"[Lawyers] have an orchestra seat from which you observe the
most fascinating spectacles.... It is like watching a gorgeous ballet
with a whole variety of dancers moving back and forth across the
stage to create a scene of beauty and rhythm."
THU RMAN ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL 270-71.
I.
In this fashion, Thurman Arnold described the joy of practicing the
art of the law. But he refused to take either himself or the law with
entire seriousness. With tongue-in-cheek pomposity, he headed the
chapter of his book in which the quoted words appear with this
Arnoldism: "The Practice of Law is a Profession of Great Dignity the
Pursuit of Which Requires Great Learning."'
As the passage quoted above reveals, Arnold enjoyed the role of an
observer. But his was participant-observation, joyously responding to
the pageant that he observed. Only an observer whose mind and heart
and emotions vividly interact with the on-stage drama can really savor
its pleasures. Arnold was such an observer. The human drama that
he saw, the heroics and absurdities of life that he witnessed, the words
that he read and heard: these were not merely data registered on the
mind, but sparks which ignited his ideas and emotions, stimuli which
adduced brilliant, pyrotechnic responses. His was not the mind which
collects, assembles and redistributes. It transformed and enriched the
data which he so voraciously sought and hungrily seized from the elab-
orate spread that life offered him.
It is therefore no wonder, as he tells us, that, in the varied experi-
ences of his wide-ranging life, he most enjoyed his career as a teacher-
a poor and inadequate word to describe his role in academia. He was
indeed a teacher-a great teacher in the sense in which a tornado,
sweeping away shabbiness and decay, may be an instrument of urban
1. T. AR~oL, FAro FIGHTS AD FOuL 252 (1965).
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renewal. Teaching for him was not just learning and organizing and
communicating a segment of the law. The teaching chair that he occu-
pied was an elevated post from which he could see life, bounce it about,
reshape and deflate it, reduce it to its essential absurdity, inflate it to
its potential greatness, toss it over to astonished colleagues and amazed
students, and recapture and again bounce it about.
Arnold was an intellectual, but only if the term is lavishly defined.
He was not an intellectual if the word describes only the accumulator
of facts and information. He was, indeed, skeptical of facts. He was
scornful of data presented as if they encapsulated life. To him, events
were vast, dynamic and kinetic phenomena. They could not be grasped
by capturing facts, even if that were possible. One might as well try to
catch a river by extracting the objects in it. Events could be dealt with
only by comprehension of their essence, and their essence could be
communicated only by abstraction.
In the world of law and political theory, he anticipated the avant
garde of the visual arts. His work dealt with life's realities, not by
attempting to reproduce them representationally, but by boldly con-
ceiving vast abstractions which often laid bare the essential reality
which the fictions and formulae of the law had obscured.
He was intrepid, fearless and original in his wrestling matches with
the raw material of life and the concepts of the law. He challenged
ideas which time had sanctified. He challenged them not because he
was irreverent, but because he was an essentially humble man. He did
not believe that the truth could be captured by mortal man. He did
not believe in eternal verities, even his own. He knew in his bones that
life defies codification; that law can be no more than a tool for shaping
life and coping with it for the time being; and that today's formula is
tomorrow's curiosity.
He knew that life is a deep, tumultuous, disorderly stream, and that
any man at any moment can see only the surface of a microscopic part
of it, can grasp only a few drops of its immensity. He knew that to
comprehend any of it, a man must immerse himself in its depths, feel
its turbulence, and seek to understand the temper and direction of its
vast currents.
He loved life because it was prolix, unlimited and turbulent. Con-
scious as he was of the limited effect of any man's efforts, he loved the
process of coping with life-of trying to direct a bit of it, so that it
served mankind and did not overwhelm the individual. And he loved
the law because, in his hands, it was a wondrously flexible implement
for that purpose.
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He was an artisan, a participant in life and the law. He had no taste
for the simplicities of the static: Yes, no, this is so, that is not so, were
words and phrases that, to Arnold, induced acute discomfort. His mind
was too rich, too restless, too subtle, too complex for them.
So it was that in his brief career as an appellate judge, Arnold was
not happy. He did not like the absolutes of pronouncing judgment, nor
did he enjoy the process, An appellate judge deals with issues that are
largely prefabricated, pre-processed by others. For Arnold, the four
corners of a record-on-appeal, the limits set by the mind and ingenuity
of others, were the walls of a prison. His genius was too rambunctious,
his mind was too fertile-too eager to soar and dive-to be content
within these limits.
So it was, that second to his experience in academia, Arnold loved
the practice of the law. To it, he brought his unique qualities.
II.
In considering Arnold's career as a lawyer, it is necessary at the outset
to admit that he did not observe Sir Edward Coke's prescription: "Give
six hours to sleep; as many to the study of righteous laws; for four hours
pray; devote two to meals; and what is over bestow upon the Sacred
Muses." He would have been more enchanted by Sir Henry Hawkins'
riposte: "If you spent all your time poring over the law, there would
be none left for breaking it.' '2 There is also no evidence that he prayed
four hours each day.
In July, 1945, after his resignation from the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Arnold formed a partner-
ship for the practice of law with a former associate in the Antitrust
Division. The firm represented two extraordinary capitalists, Cyrus
Eaton and Robert Young, in litigation to obtain control of the Pullman
car service. They lost the case," and the partnership was soon dissolved.
Thereafter, in January, 1946, the firm of Arnold and Fortas was
organized.
The purpose of the firm was to provide a means for its two partners
to make a living. Neither partner quite knew how this was to be done.
At the outset, neither had a single client or any prospects; but both
were dedicated to the great cause of economic survival which they had
2. HINE, CONFESSIONS Or AN UNCOMMON ATrORNEY 3 (1945).
3. United States v. Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd nem. by an
equally divided court, 330 U.S. 806 (1947).
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undertaken. Somehow, by the mysterious process of law and life, the
venture went forward, and increasing numbers of partners and asso-
dates joined it.
The time was propitious for law practice in the Nation's capital.
The Nation's business was struggling under the mass of rules, regula-
tions and restrictions which World War II had spawned. New enter-
prises had arisen in great number. Washington know-how was in
demand, and the proliferation of Washington law firms had not yet
taken place. Lawyers who were veterans of the New Deal and govern-
ment service were presumed to be qualified to find their way through
the maze, to guide and assist companies which had unfamiliar problems.
These were relatively simple days in terms of the individual lawyer's
approach to the problems of his working life. The object was to make a
living, in economic terms. The criterion which determined the lawyer's
decision as to whether he would represent a client, with few exceptions,
was entirely pragmatic: Was the prospective client's problem such that
the law firm could advise and represent the client with a reasonable
prospect that the firm could contribute something of value for which
payment could and would be received?
Criminal cases and controversies involving the poor and social issues
did not come to the larger or established law firms. The poor and the
ordinary persons accused of crime were generally unrepresented in
those days, or their counsel were drawn from a specialized part of the
bar or from "courthouse lawyers."
Occasionally a corporate lawyer might be appointed by the court to
represent a defendant who could not otherwise obtain counsel, but such
appointments were rare. Law firms of the Establishment would virtu-
ously, and modestly, contribute to the inadequate and ineffective legal
aid societies. And that was that.
There were, in the Nation, a few notable exceptions to this pattern,
like the lawyers who undertook the defense of the Scottsboro defen-
dants. But there was no suggestion that lawyers were not justified in
conducting a purely commercial practice. A lawyer, young or old, came
to his office to serve clients who enlisted, ordinarily by purchase, the
services of his firm. If a lawyer had interests other than the commercial
practice of his firm, such as serving the poor or oppressed, those inter-
ests were part of his personal life, not integrated with his work with
the law firm.
It was largely by chance rather than by planned choice, that Arnold's
finn first became involved in the service of non-commercial clients--in
the issue of individual freedom from governmental oppression which
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arose in the middle 40's and 50's. As usual, of course, the chance that
brought about the event was not mere accident. It was the product of
time and place, and of the background and ideological identification of
the members of the firm. We were "liberals." We were New Dealers.
The overwhelming issue of those years was the supposed Communist
threat to the institutions of this Nation. The Depression and the New
Deal had activated the social conscience of millions of our people. As
usual, and as is currently happening, many of the young and not-so-
young people of conscience sought ultimate and absolute answers to
the startling problems of economic disarray, inadequacy of ideals, and
corruption of practices which those events had disclosed. The ideology
and agencies of Soviet Communism seemed to promise not just reform,
but Utopia; and many of those who sought a final answer to social prob-
lems, along with some who searched for the warm comfort of together-
ness in a seemingly noble venture, were irresistibly attracted to
Communism's allure. Happily, there were vastly more flirtations than
affaires, more engagements than marriages; the Communist apparatus,
being essentially conspiratorial, would not accept many for member-
ship, and the extreme rigidities and essential destructiveness of the
Communists soon disillusioned all except a few of those who were first
attracted to it.
But to the Establishment of those days, the danger of a Communist
take-over was real and terrorizing; and the distinction between re-
formers and revolutionists was much too precarious for acceptance. The
awesome power of the federal government was leveled upon them all,
and a reign of terror ensued. The instruments were surveillance, accusa-
tion, dismissal from government and private jobs, and public exposure
as disloyalists. The hysteria reached its apogee in the mad behavior of
Senator Joseph McCarthy. It subsided only as his excesses nauseated
the American people and only after he was brought to heel by the
formal censure of his Senatorial peers.
Arnold's firm became involved in 1946, in the early stages of the
loyalty crusade. It entered the fray when one of its associates brought
to the firm the problem of an acquaintance of his, a man named Fried-
man who was an official of the War Manpower Commission. Friedman
had been discharged for disloyalty on the basis of alleged pro-Commu-
nist expressions and associations. We lost the case; 4 but in the course
of its defense the firm acquired the identification and commitment
4. Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 830 1U,5s 838
(1947), rehearing denied, 831 U.S. 865 (1947).
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which made inevitable its subsequent involvement in the resistance to
McCarthyism.
In Fair Fights and Foul, Arnold quotes the following passage from
the firm's brief in support of its petition for certiorari in the Friedman
case: 5
But this assault on freedom of opinion will not stop with Gov-
ernment employees. Assaults upon freedom have a habit of grow-
ing beyond a stated objective. They quickly attack not merely a
manifestation, but freedom itself. So this crusade, once under way,
will not stop with its victims in the federal service. It will spread
and is now spreading over this country, blighting our democracy
and bringing fear and distrust to American homes throughout the
nation.
The prophecy proved all too true.
In the years that followed, extending into the 1960's, Arnold's firm
was engaged in the defense or in attempts to obtain the reinstatement
of many other government employees as well as in causes involving
private citizens who were victims of the anti-Communist hysteria.
Among them, to name only some of the matters of public record, were
the cases involving Dorothy Bailey,0 Dr. Johm P. Peters of Yale 7 Owen
Lattimore," and Dr. Edward Condon, Director of the Bureau of
Standards.
All of these cases involved the perennial and fundamental issues of
First Amendment freedoms: the substantive right of individuals to
differ from the orthodox; to hold and express dissenting opinions, how-
ever fundamentally divergent they may be; and to associate with others
in the discussion and advancement of those views. Most of them in-
volved fundamental questions of procedural rights: to specific charges,
to confrontation and cross-examination, to judgments based solely on
substantial evidence, to the presentation of a defense, and to counsel.
They were great social issues; but they were issues in the special
province of the law and lawyers. When the same sorts of constitutional
and legal issues were presented to Arnold by persons with whose polit-
ical view he disagreed, he and his firm nevertheless readily enlisted in
5. Arnold, supra note I, at 205, quoting from Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Fried-
man v. Schwellenbach, cert. denied, 330 U.S. 838 (1947), rehearing denied, 331 US. 865
(1947).
6. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 341 US. 918 (1951).
7. Peters v. Hobby, 349 US. 531 (1954).
8. United States v. Lattimore, 232 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aff'g 127 F. Supp. 405
(D.D.C. 1955); 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954), modifying 112 F. Supp. 507 (D.D.C. 1953);
125 F. Supp 295 (D.D.C. 1954).
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their defense. Conspicuous among these cases was the litigation to free
Ezra Pound from detention in the criminal ward at St. Elizabeth's
Hospital, where he had been confined for thirteen years awaiting a
certification of mental competence to stand trial for treason in World
War II.9
As I reconsider these activities of Arnold and his law firm, I am im-
pressed by certain respects in which they differ from the comparable
activities of law firms today.
1. The costly, unremunerative and hazardous work of defending
individuals whose First Amendment rights were at stake was not under-
taken as part of any general acceptance by the profession of a duty to
serve in these causes. There were, indeed, other lawyers and law firms
which took the risk of public condemnation and shouldered the sub-
stantial burden of the defense of loyalty cases, but there were not many.
Paul Porter tells of this barbed exchange with a fellow lawyer whom he
encountered at a golf club and who reflected the hostility of much of
the bar to this work:
Lawyer: "Paul, I understand your firm is engaged in defending
homosexuals and Communists."
Porter: "That's right. What can we do for you?"
Today, one of the welcome and encouraging developments in our
Nation has been the widespread acceptance by the bar of an obligation
to provide representation for the poor in both civil and criminal
matters. To many young lawyers this acceptance of a duty to represent
individuals is inadequate. They believe that the bar has and should
recognize an obligation to represent, not merely individuals, but causes,
such as product safety or environmental control or anti-establishmen-
tarianism. But even they, I think, would agree that the profession has
come a long way in acknowledging and accepting a measure of social
responsibility.
2. In Arnold's day there was little or no pressure from young law-
yers, emerging from law schools, for firms which employed them to
undertake non-remunerative, controversial cases. On the contrary, the
cycle of the generations was such that most of the younger men in the
40's and 50's were dominated by economic motivation. They were apt
to be followers rather than leaders in professionally and personally dan-
gerous undertakings in the public arena.
The reverse is true today. Many young lawyers are seeking positions
in Neighborhood Legal Services, Public Defender's Offices, and the like.
9. See CoRN., TBE TRAm OF EzRA PouND 128 ff. and passim (1966).
994
Vol. 79: 988, 1970
Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of the Law
An economic incentive is no longer the focus of their careers. Many
more, whose devotion to public service, and whose repudiation of
economic ambition, does not extend quite so far, are seeking to combine
affluence and employment security with the satisfaction of good works,
as they view them, and of exerting pressure upon their law firms to
engage in such activities.
3. There was reason, in Arnold's time, for lawyers to fear that clients
and prospective clients would disapprove of these unpopular activities,
and that their disapproval would defeat the basic reason for the exis-
tence of the law firm: that is, to make a living.
Today, a law firm's work on behalf of blacks and civil rights may be
hazardous in parts of the country where racial feeling is intense. But
the Nation and its business and financial leaders, too, have come a long
way. Nothing exists comparable in scope to the practically universal
paranoia about Communism which made the defense of civil liberties
dangerous for lawyers in Arnold's time.
4. The non-remunerative work undertaken by Arnold's firm was
conventionally professional. It was largely litigation in the courts or
before administrative officials. The issues were legal, involving ques-
tions of constitutional and administrative law and procedure. It is true
that many of the problems and principles were novel, and that often
the lawyer was compelled to frame tactics, to thrust and counter-attack,
with an eye to the impact of public opinion and the press upon his
cause. But this is not unfamiliar even to the lawyer engaged in dramatic
commercial contests, sensitive as he may be to the canons of propriety.
And it is also true that there was constant awareness of the largeness of
the issues, the dimensions of the public and human values, that were
implicit in the particular case.
Today, much of the non-commercial work comparable in social
relevance to that of Arnold's firm is also conventionally professional,
but some of it differs in ways that are professionally significant. Law
firms are challenged by young lawyers to take on causes rather than
cases; and while most civil rights cases are also causes, there is a differ-
ence. As the young lawyer views many of today's battles, the client is of
relatively little importance. The cause, not the client, is the object of
dedication. The client is a technical necessity, not a person whose life
or welfare is at stake. The undertaking is shaped and prosecuted not
in defense or vindication of the client, but in maximum furtherance of
the idea or program. It is, in essence, project-lawyering, rather than
client representation. Urban renewal, environment improvement, re-
structuring of the welfare system, justice for classes of people like the
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American Indians or the Mexican-Americans, and similar great causes,
are the focus of the legal work in these cases, rather than the defense or
vindication of an individual who has come to the law firm seeking help.
5. In Arnold's time, there was no uncertainty as to the function and
responsibility of a law firm. It was to serve and represent each client as
an individual, whether the client was a corporate malefactor or a pre-
sumably saintly civil libertarian. Once a client had been accepted, the
lawyer's course was clear. If the interest of the client required the lawyer
to advocate a position or seek a result which he personally disliked or
even which he considered contrary to society's welfare, it was the law-
yer's duty to do so with all his mind and heart, subject only to the
restrictions and proprieties which the rules and conventions impose.
Ezra Pound, the Grand Kleagle of the Ku Klux Klan, a cigarette com-
pany, a rapist, a great corporation which polluted the streams, a govern-
ment typist-all were entitled to and received the same total commit-
ment and dedication, once their cause had been undertaken. And the
social implications of the position to be taken on the client's behalf
were submerged by the lawyer's dedication to the value of the legal
and constitutional system as he saw it, to the duty of the advocate, and
to the obligations of advocacy in an adversary system.
Nor was the client permitted to dictate or determine the strategy or
substance of the representation, even if the client insisted that his
prescription for the litigation was necessary to serve the larger cause
to which he was committed. I recall a civil liberties case which the firm
undertook and later, with court permission, abandoned because the
client insisted upon tactics and positions which we believed were neither
appropriate nor permissible in view of the pending judicial proceeding.
Currently, among young lawyers, there is a great deal of ferment
about the appropriate role of lawyers and law firms. Young lawyers
have raised questions like these: May their law firm, in good conscience,
represent a cigarette company, or a manufacturer of napalm or a com-
pany that has made defective school buses? Some of these young lawyers
are apt to approve of their firm's decision to represent a rapist or some-,
one accused of stealing welfare checks; but to disapprove of its repre-
sentation of a corporation which has engaged in the production of goods
which the lawyers consider to be contrary to the public interest.
Faced with this deeply-felt, passionate attitude of some of the young
lawyers of this generation, Arnold's reaction was one of sharp, although
amused, disagreement. He was not persuaded that it is commendable
for a lawyer to devote his skill to defending a rapist, but disreputable
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to represent a tobacco company. He would have been gaily tolerant of a
young man's fancy if he preferred rape to cigarettes. Chactin a son
gout, he might have said in his World War I French; but he would
have laughingly suggested that it is at least debatable whether the
defense of the Boston Strangler reflects dedication to a higher social
objective than the representation of Philip Morris.
His essential position was that the distinction is irrelevant to the
lawyer's mission: Both the rapist and the manufacturer are entitled to
counsel and to the lawyer's dedication and zeal in their interests; the
social values of their character and conduct are not the lawyer's concern
unless they are so abhorrent to the lawyer, and he is so emotionally
involved, that he feels that he cannot represent the client with full
dedication. There is nothing dishonorable in representing a commercial
client for money or in representing a rapist out of a sense of duty to
the law and our legal system; and while Arnold felt, as I do, that a law
firm's work should include a quantity of social-service, non-remunera-
tive activities, it does not follow that the firm is obliged to assess the
social implications of the activities of those seeking its services.
Every person, poor or rich, criminal or corporation, is entitled to the
services of a lawyer. This is the fundamental basis of our constitutional
system. If a lawyer doesn't choose to represent a particular corporation,
he need not do so. The corporation usually can find lawyers; but the
lawyer who chooses not to represent a corporation should not elevate
his personal predilection into a principle of universal application to
others. He should not-he may not-ignore the basic principle of our
system that the corporation, whatever the issue may be, is entitled to
counsel.
Currently, also, there is a view among some lawyers who are active
in the controversies of our time, that a lawyer must or may continue in
a case despite the client's deliberate disruption of court proceedings, or
that the lawyer may even encourage or participate in his client's efforts
to incite public opposition to the trial or to use the legal process, in-
cluding the courtroom, for violent and disruptive propaganda in sup-
port of his social cause. Classical anarchists called this sort of violent,
disruptive behavior, attacking an essential instrument of society, the
"propaganda of the deed." Earl Browder, former head of the Commu-
nist Party, referred to it as using the trial or the hearing room as a
"transmission belt" for attacks upon the social order. But to a lawyer,
in his role as such, this is and must be entirely unacceptable. The gap
between Arnold's generation and the present cannot excuse such a
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departure from the obligations of the profession to protect the legal
process and the institutions of the law from efforts to prevent their
functioning.
IIl.
The combination of commercial and socially significant issues
handled by Arnold's law firm was uniquely fashioned to his taste. He
loved its variety. He immensely enjoyed the profusion of happenings
which the assortment of problems brought within the range of his
voracious appetite for life and the law. He delighted in the varied and
complex life-situations that were laid before the firm, as a sculptor
rejoices in his tools and in the clay and marble upon which they operate.
But he was not merely an irrepressible and astonishing artist of the law.
He was personally involved, personally committed. He had a capacity
for indignation whenever he saw unfairness or oppression. He was an
individualist, and he was outraged when big government or a big corpo-
ration used its power to oppress or circumscribe individuals. I think
that, despite his scintillating, devastating writings on the economic and
social implications of antitrust, Arnold's passion as an antitruster
stemmed directly from this basic, humanistic attitude-a Westerner's
dislike of suppression, a Westerner's commitment to the openness of
life.
He was one of the last of freedom's gladiators who fought freedom's
battles on these terms, the old-fashioned American terms. He was one
of the last of the generation which was whole-heartedly committed to
the fight for individual freedom, without regard to freedom-for-what:
for freedom in the forum, on the street corner, in the market-place; for
the freedom of everybody: right, left or just mixed-up-rich man, poor
man, beggar man, thief; black man, white man, Ku Kluxer, fascist or
Communist.
IV.
That was the shape, in those days, of a commercial law practice
which included participation in the great public issues of the time. It
demonstrated the conventional characteristics of the lawyer: zealous
dedication to the client's cause, insistence upon excellence of product,
and the trained and deliberate schizophrenia which is essential to ob.
jectivity of substantive advice and procedural strategy: the disciplined
isolation of personal passion from judgment which is an essential in.
gredient of the professional.
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We are now living in an age which is markedly different from the
40's and 50's. The years between Arnold's law practice and the present
are few; but the differences are vast. History in our time has accelerated
at a bewildering rate. The crucial drama enacted in the theatre of the
law is not the same today. Events have changed the plots, the story lines,
the music and even the types of characters.
The terms and conditions of living together in this Nation have
rapidly and profoundly changed. The cozy pattern of an Establishment
at the top, staffed by wise, dignified, able gentlemen; of a docile genera-
tion of young people, caps in hand, waiting their turn to occupy the
slots in the Establishment; and of a vast mass of 23,000,000 blacks at
the bottom, humbly accepting crumbs from the table, and ready to
serve-this pattern is gone forever. The New Deal ruffled its surface;
World War II punched holes in it; the protest movement of the blacks
tore it; Vietnam fragmented it; affluence and state assumption of cradle-
to-grave responsibility undermined the need for it; and the Supreme
Court, the Kennedys, President Johnson and the student activists com-
pleted the job.-The old pattern is gone.
Because of our constitutional system, our common-law inspiration,
and the historic role of lawyers in our Nation's hierarchy, our law and
law courts have often been the theatre in which social conflict is acted
out and its issues resolved. With the advent of the Warren Court, this
unique role was progressively expanded. Procedurally, access to the
court for resolution of conflict has been greatly increased by the open-
ing of new doors to adjudication.10 That expansion has embraced a new
constituency of poor people" and in greatly increased measure, those
convicted of crime.'2 Substantively, crucial social and political issues
that comprehensively affect the structure and dynamics of the Nation-
ranging from controversies as to the duty of the state to provide welfare
to indigents13 to the composition of elected agencies'-have for the
first time become grist for the mill of the law, lawyers and courts.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the theatre of the law has under-
gone radical change. The crucial battleground of the law has shifted;
the critical issues have profoundly changed; the initiative has passed
10. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Flast v. Cohen, 392 US. 83
(1968).
11. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Gideon v. lVainwright, 372 Us.
335 (1963).
12. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961); Fay v. Noia, 372 US. 391 (1963); Peyton
v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); Carafs v. LaVallee, 391 US. 234 (1968).
13. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
14. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186 (1962).
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from the hands of the Establishment. The fighting theme of the dramas
enacted in the theatre of the law is no longer the personal rights of an
individual to his personal freedoms, but the social prerogatives of vast
numbers of the people.
To the new generation, for example, the defense of Dr. Peters' right
to a job,15 threatened because he held and expressed modestly deviant
political opinions, may seem like a production of Lady Windermere's
Fan: it may be interesting and good theatre, it may present a human
problem, but it's not significantly "relevant." To them, the crucial unit
is not the individual, but masses of people; and the crucial issues relate
not to the individual's rights to speak and associate, but to the welfare
of multitudes. Only if the individual is attacked because of conduct
which is part of a mass activity-only, for example, if the conduct is
part of a mass assault upon the Establishment (like the case of the
Chicago 7)-is the attack deemed worthy of the indignation of the
young. With this democratization of the grievances deemed worthy
of passionate commitment, the theatre of the law has radically changed.
Young lawyers have changed. Those who spark their generation are
no longer directed by predominantly economic motives. In this respect,
they share the temper of their generation. They share its agony and its
crusades. They share its demand that they, too, must have a role in
shaping the future. In the new theatre of the law, they have seized major
roles as script writers, and actors and producers; and the issues in the
courts and the techniques of the law show their impact. They have
awakened to the promise of an ideal social order that is and has always
been implicit in the noble words of the Constitution-in phrases such
as equal protection and due process. They have seized the possibility
of fulfilling the greatness of our Constitution's words. They have seen
that many of the conflicts and injustices of our society may be shaped
in the mold of dramas suitable for resolution in the theatre of the law,
and that these grievances need not fester and accumulate until violence
is the only alternative to endurance.
The result of all of this is not necessarily mournful. America has
changed. It will never be the same. Law and the profession and practice
of law have changed. They have achieved a new dimension.
Clearly, the time had come for the law to be available-in-fact to all,
white, black, rich or poor. Clearly, the time had come for lawyers to be
available-in-fact to all. And clearly, I believe, the time had come for
the magical phrases of equal protection and due process to acquire a
15. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1954).
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new and additional dimension. Clearly, the law's obligation to serve
the cause of freedom can no longer be limited to the religious and
political guaranties of the First Amendment-to be circumscribed by
the stuff of the mind and the eyes and the tongue.
As in any vast, radical move of a society, the changes that are in
process have their dangers, their extremes and their absurdities. Law,
lawyers and the courts, in our society, in this time of fundamental
change, have a profound and challenging role. It is not easy to measure
up to the task and the opportunity. Skill, intelligence and the craftsman-
ship of great architecture are essential. We can overload our legal
system. We can overestimate the capability of lawyers in their role as
courtroom advocates and of the courts to effect change. The capability
of the courts and court-made law, after all, is limited, not only by their
nature and their charter but also by the limitations of their techniques.
Courts can and must rule "Thou shalt" or "Thou shalt not;" but it is
a delusion of competence to assume that they can comprehensively
write the detailed prescriptions for a new society. They can administer
punishment and distribute absolution, but they are not good or suitable
substitutes for legislative and administrative implementation of com-
mands. They can rule, for example, that it is the duty of the state to
respond to the demands of those who face hunger and malnutrition;
but they can hardly be depended upon to decree the amount and type
of protein that must be furnished to avoid mental retardation.
The Nation has fortunately come a long way since Justice Jackson's
statement in 1941 that "The mere state of being without funds is a
neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance .... 10 In some instances,
a response to poverty may now be a constitutional imperative-not an
irrelevance. This was the revolutionary teaching of Griffin v. Illinois,17
where, as the dissenting Mr. Justice Harlan protested, the Court held
that there are circumstances in which the state has an affirmative duty
"to lift the handicaps flowing from different economic circumstances."' 8
The animating principle of Griffin is an inspiring doctrine with
which I agree; but we must be careful and skillful, as well as bold
and determined, as we exploit the capability of our Constitution as a
self-executing mandate and of our courts to move us with dispatch and
effectiveness towards a more just society. We must not disregard their
16. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-185 (1941) (concurring opinion).
17. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
18. 351 U.S. at 34. The dissenting opinion of four Justices complained that, "The
Constitution requires the equal protection of the law, but it does not require the States
to provide equal finandal means for all defendants to avail themseves of such laws."
rd. at 29.
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limitations; nor may we properly forget that legislatures, Presidents,
Governors and mayors, too, have their function or that those who wish
to propel our society towards a greater destiny must insist that these
agencies of government, like the courts, do their part.
Danger may lie ahead, too, if lawyers, in their role as such, repudiate
their professional techniques and responsibilities. As lawyers, they are
agents, not principals; and they are agents confined by the rules of their
forum. They are obligated to make the legal system work. They are
not at liberty, in their capacity as lawyers, to disrupt or participate in
disrupting its workings by the tactics of the street or the barroom.
Aggressive, powerful representation neither requires nor permits this.
Lawyers are agents, not principals; and they should neither criticize
nor tolerate criticism based upon the character of the client whom they
represent or the cause that they prosecute or defend. They cannot and
should not accept responsibility for the client's practices. Rapists,
murderers, child-abusers, General Motors, Dow Chemical-and even
cigarette manufacturers and stream-polluters-are entitled to a lawyer;
and any lawyer who undertakes their representation must be immune
from criticism for so doing.
None of this is in derogation of the massive role of lawyers in shaping
America's destiny in the years that lie ahead. Lawyers have a unique
capacity to cause all agencies of government, not merely the courts, to
meet their responsibilities. And as an officer, not merely of the court
but also of the law, the lawyer has a special responsibility in his role
as a citizen, to participate in shaping the Nation's policy and program.
But in his special, professional capacity, he must act professionally,
within the limits and strictures of his calling.
V.
In his last years, Thurman Arnold was sensitively aware of the vast
changes which had come about in the law and the objects and condi-
tions of its deployment. He was ever young in spirit, but with his
customary candor, he recognized the passage of time. In a speech made
on January 24, 1968, almost two years before he died, he said
I am an old man, and most of the things that I remember best never
really happened. 19
19. Speech by Thurman Arnold, Annual Dinner of the Antitrust Section of the New
York State Bar Association, January, 1968.
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He saw in the changes much promise as well as considerable peril.
Sometimes he seemed to feel that in the theatre of the law the old-
fashioned morality play had been displaced by Hair. But he sensed the
prospect of the emergence of a new and better order. He had the
teacher's perceptiveness about young lawyers, and he saw the solid
core of the good that underlay the dust and confusion of their some-
times frantic efforts to get-with-it-not to be left behind in the revolu-
tion of their times, but to participate, fully and vividly, in its anguish
and effort.
He had little patience with pretentiousness, including the pretensions
of judges and lawyers to remake the world. He did not like Latin
maxims; he objected to the use of middle initials, including his own;
and he loved to laugh at hyperbole, at pretentious simile and symbol.
He disliked the man-lawyer or layman-who, like the barnyard
rooster, believes that it is his crowing that makes the sun rise every
morning.
I believe he was enchanted by the happenings in the theatre of the
law. I think he was secretly delighted by the vitality reflected in the
new activism of young lawyers and the new dimension of the theatre
of the law. But he admonished this generation of young lawyers to
remember that they are lawyers; that the law is a marvelous and power-
ful instrument, but that, if it is to be effective, it must be deployed with
resourceful use of its own techniques, within the limits of its charter
and its capabilities. He would, I think, have wanted young lawyers to
enlist in the welfare of their time, but when they did so as lawyers,
for others, to act as agents for principals. He would have urged them
in this capacity to represent clients, not themselves or their causes;
and to do this fiercely, competently and courageously; and to participate
as lawyers in all of the causes within the reach of the law and its
remedies. He would have wanted them to deploy the law in the inter-
ests of people, and he would have himself enlisted his vast ingenuity
and resourcefulness in the cause.
To a considerable extent, the vast social decisions of the past decade
may be traced to litigation lawyers who had the ingenuity and the skill
to shape the issues and to carry them through the maze of the courts,
sensitively and astutely. In substantial measure, it was the Warren
Court that opened the new frontier of life in this Nation; but the
decisions handed down by the Warren Court would never have
existed except that lawyers shaped the issues and brought the
cases to it. It was lawyers who pointed the way and who made possible
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the advances toward the goal of comprehensive dignity which our
Constitution embodies. It was lawyers, engaged in the great and ever-
new practice of law. It was they who saw the conflicts in justiciable
terms; who framed the issues, marshalled the facts and the concepts
of the law; and who shaped and guided the cases to the point of
decision.
Even in this moment of bitter counter-action in the Nation, the
summons, the possibility and the imperative remain to challenge the
legal profession: to use the practice of the law comprehensively, in the
fashion which our institutions require and make possible; to serve
clients in the mundane activities of commerce, but also to enlist in
fulfillment of the pledge of our Constitution and laws, in the interests
of humanity.
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